St. John's Law Review
Volume 40, December 1965, Number 1

Article 7

Antitrust--Sherman Act--Sections 1 & 2 Held Applicable to Labor
Union-Employer National Wage Agreement (United Mine Workers
v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965))
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

RECENT DECISIONS
ANTITRUSTPLICABLE
MENT. -

To

SHERMAN

AcT-

SECTIONS

LABOR UNION-EMPLOYER

1

& 2

NATIONAL

HELD

AP-

WAGE AGREE-

Appellant-union entered into a collective bargaining contract with several large coal companies and agreed to impose the
terms of the national wage agreement upon all coal operators regardless of their ability to pay. The United States Supreme Court held
that an agreement between a union and one group of employers to
secure uniform labor standards throughout an industry is not exempt
from antitrust legislation.' However, the court of appeals' affirmance of the district court's judgment for the defendant-coal company
was reversed on the ground of an improper jury instruction. United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
From 1890 until 1930, organized labor suffered serious disadvantages in its drive to obtain effective bargaining power. 2 In
1890, Congress passed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act which made
certain combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade illegal. 3
The legislative history indicates that the Act was not intended to
be applied to labor unions.4 However, in Lawlor v. Loewe, 5 the
United States Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of a union
for violating the Sherman Act. Disturbed at the hostility of the
courts, the American Federation of Labor made a determined effort
to influence federal legislation during the early 1900's. 6 This effort
culminated in the passage of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act 7 in 1914
In
126 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1958).
general, § 1 prohibits combinations in restraint of trade, and § 2 provides
for criminal prosecution.
2 See GRFGoRY, LABOR AND THE, LAW 158-223 (2d ed. 1961).
3 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (1958).
4Senator Sherman, speaking on the floor of the U.S. Senate, declared
that his bill had nothing to do with labor unions. COHEN, LABOR LAW
See also Bernhardt, The Allen Bradley Doctrine: An Ac117 (1964).
commodation of Conflicting Policies, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 1094 (1962).
r 235 U.S. 522 (1915). The Court concluded that a secondary boycott which
unlawfully interfered with interstate commerce fell within the strictures of
Act.
the Sherman
6
The union presented a "Bill of Grievances" to the President and Congress asking for immunity from the Sherman Act. CoBm, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 119.
7 Section 6 states: "The labor of a human being is not a commodity
or article of commerce. . . :' 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1958).
Section 20 bars injunctions "in any case between an employer and employees,
or between employers and employees" involving a dispute over terms and
conditions of employment. 38 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1958).
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which attempted, inter alia, to discourage the application of the
Sherman Act to labor unions by protecting certain labor conduct
from injunction. The ambiguous wording of the new Act, however,
fostered the holding in Duplex v. Deering8 that the Clayton Act
was not a bar to antitrust prosecution where union activities restrained interstate commerce. Duplex's true significance is found
in the prophetic dissent of Justice Brandeis who asserted that the
Clayton Act was meant to legalize certain labor behavior regardless
of its effect on commerce.9
With the economic depression of the 1930's came the substantiation of the Brandeis dissent. The demise of a conservative
Congress resulted in the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in
1932 10 which, without the ambiguities contained in the Sherman
Act, eliminated the use of injunctions against unions involved in2
"labor disputes." " In 1935, the National Labor Relations Act'
(popularly known as the Wagner Act) limited an employer's right
to interfere with union activities and determined that wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment were mandatory
subjects over which labor and management must bargain. With
the attainment of such favorable legislation, labor then looked to
the courts for support.3 In Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,'4 the
Supreme Court declared that a union strike, utilized to effectuate a
wage agreement with an employer, was not subject to the antitrust
laws regardless of its effect on interstate commerce. In United
States v. Hutcheson,'5 the Court read the Norris-LaGuardia Act ' 6
in conjunction with the Clayton Act ' 7 and concluded that action
The Court noted that the individuals engaged
$254 U.S. 443 (1921).
in the strikes and boycotts were not employees of the Duplex Company.
From this it concluded that the Clayton Act was not applicable since it only
exempted cases between employers and employees. Accord, Bedford Cut Stone
Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927).
9 Duplex v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) (dissenting opinion).
1047 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1958).
1 A "labor dispute" was defined as including any controversy over terms
and conditions of employment. 47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113 (1958).
1249 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1958).
The
Act set up a three-man National Labor Relations Board which has been
said to have reflected the desire of Congress to narrow the judiciary's
role in the formulation of labor policy by entrusting principal enforcement
responsibilities to an administrative agency. Winter, Collective Bargaining
and Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities,
73 YALE LJ. 14, 38 (1963).
"s President Roosevelt's attempt to "pack" the Supreme Court in 1937 was
an important factor in the Court's change of attitude. ScHrEsixaGE, THE
POLMCS OF UPHEAVAL chs. 24, 25, 26 (1960).
14 310 U.S. 469 (1940). Cf. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley

Farm Prods., Inc., 311 U.S. 91 (1940).
15 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
16 47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113 (1958).
'738 Stat. 731 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1958).
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taken pursuant to a "labor dispute," which could not be enjoined
under the Clayton Act, was ipso facto exempt from the Sherman
Act. The Court clarified Hutcheson in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3,
IBEW,8 by stating that a union violated the Sherman Act if it
combined with non-labor groups to create business monopolies and
to control the marketing of goods and services.
Thus, labor unions were exempt from antitrust legislation except in cases where direct evidence of a conspiracy was revealed. 19
The courts uniformly declared that the formulation of labor policy
fell within the province of the legislature rather than the judiciary.20
As a result, the courts would not make a determination as to whether
a union had a legitimate interest in a subject of collective bargaining, but rather, would not interfere with labor-management relations
except2 1 in instances of clearly apparent conspiracies in restraint of
trade.

Such broad immunity from the antitrust laws led to many
abuses by organized labor.22 This, combined with the improved
public image of business after World War II, resulted in the 1947
Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act.2 3 The amendments
enumerated unfair union practices and set up a system for policing
collective bargaining. Disenchantment with labor activities continued into the early 1950's when corrupt union practices 24 gave
birth to the Landrum-Griffin amendment, 25 which set up rules by
which the internal structures of unions were to be regulated.
In the instant case, the trustee of a union welfare fund filed
suit in a federal district court against a coal company for failure to
18325 U.S. 797, 808 (1945). The union was convicted in this case of
aiding non-labor groups to create business monopolies. Accord, United
States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186, 190 (1954); United
Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1947); Local 175,
IBEW v. United States, 219 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1955).
19 See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 805-11
(1945).
20 See Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., Inc.,

311 U.S. 91, 102-03 (1940); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co.,
303 U.S. 552, 562 (1938).
21 See, e.g., Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955) ; Garner

v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).

22 See GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAw 279-88 (2d ed. 1961); Hunt v.
Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821 (1945).
2361 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-68 (1958).
Some other important
provisions of the Act were: (1) a ninety day "cooling off" period after a
strike deadline if the work-stoppage threatened the national security,
(2) unions had a right to choose their own bargaining agents or to
reject unions altogether, (3) it was an unfair labor practice for a union
or its agents to use force or direct threats to impose organization on unwilling
employees.
24 Television coverage of the Senate investigation of the Teamsters Union
did considerable damage to labor prestige. See KYmE-DvY, THE E-Em"
WITHIN (1960).
2573 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1964).
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make royalty payments under a collective bargaining contract containing a national wage agreement 2 6 The coal company filed a
cross-claim against the union alleging a violation of the antitrust
laws because of a union agreement with the larger employers to
impose the terms of the wage agreement upon all operators regardless of their ability to pay. The trustee made a motion to dismiss
alleging that the agreement concerned a mandatory subject of collective bargaining and thus was immune from antitrust prosecution.2
The motion was denied and the jury returned a verdict
29
against the union 2 which was affirmed by the court of appeals.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, but did not disturb
the lower court's finding that the union was not exempt from the
antitrust laws.
The majority opinion, by Mr. Justice White, reasoned that
Section 20 of the Clayton Act and Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act permit unions to act alone with immunity from antitrust prosecution, but that neither act deals with agreements between unions and employers.3 0 It further determined that although
wages are a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, agreements
concerning them are not per se exempt from antitrust legislation,
since the policy of the antitrust laws is enunciated clearly against
employer-union agreements seeking to prescribe labor standards
outside the bargaining unit.3 '

The Court concluded that the union

did not have a legitimate interest in the subject matter of the
agreement because the union benefits to be derived therefrom would
be indirect.
Mr. justice Goldberg concurred in the reversal but dissented
from the opinion, reasoning that labor-management agreements involving mandatory subjects of collective bargaining are per se
exempt from the antitrust laws unless there is direct evidence of
a conspiracy in restraint of trade. In his view, a determination by
the courts as to what are legitimate interests of unions32would usurp
the power of Congress in the field of labor legislation.
Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in the reversal, reasoned that
an industry-wide wage agreement containing provisions, the pur26United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
27Levis v. Pennington, TRADE REG. REP. (1961 Trade Cas.), ff 70,036
(FTC Dkt. 3431, May 17, 1961).
28 Id. at 78,129.
29 Pennington v. United Mine Workers, 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963).
so Supra note 26, at 661-62. The opinion of the Court, expressing the
views of six members, was written by Mr. Justice White. Mr. Justice
Douglas concurred joined by Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Clark.
Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice
Stewart, concurred in the reversal but dissented from the opinion.
31 Id. at 664-65.
32 The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg is contained in Local
189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 709
(1965).
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pose of which is to force some employers out of business, is prima

facie evidence of a violation of the antitrust laws.33
The Court decided Pennington and Local 189, Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.34 on the same day. In Jewel Tea,
the appellant, a butchers' union, was convicted by the court of
appeals 3 5 of violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Act on the ground
that it entered into an agreement with a group of employers to
limit the operational hours of meat markets. The Supreme Court
reversed on the narrow factual ground that the union did have a
legitimate interest in the marketing hours of its employer since the
additional hours of operation would increase the workload of the
butchers.36
'Ir. Justice White, writing the opinion of the Court, 37
made it clear, however, that if an intimate connection between hours
of work (which is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining)
and hours of sale had not been evident, the union would have lost
its immunity from the Sherman Act.
A combination of the majority view in Pennington and the
opinion of the Court in Jewel Tea restricts the broad exemption
from antitrust liability previously enjoyed by labor. A collective
bargaining agreement between a union and an employer which is
intended to secure a uniform standard may now subject the union
to antitrust liability. The courts will now be carefully examining
collective bargaining agreements when antitrust suits are brought.
If the agreement concerns a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, there will be no automatic exemption from antitrust liability,
although it will be considered strong evidence in favor of immunity.38
The courts may evaluate the directness of the benefit to the union
before applying the possible exemption. If the agreement concerns
a non-mandatory subject of bargaining, this of itself, will be substantial evidence of antitrust liability because of the lack of a strong
union interest.
The above conclusions do not necessarily mean that there will
be an increase in antitrust convictions, but in determining whether
or not a labor exemption exists, the type and quantum of evidence
admissible in ordinary antitrust actions, including indirect evidence
and inferences, will be applicable in labof situations. A judge and
33
34 Supra

note 26, at 673.
Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S.
676 (1965).
35 Jewel Tea Co. v. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 331 F.2d
547 3 (7th Cir. 1960).
6Supra note 34, at 682.
37The opinion of the Court was written by Mr. Justice White and
joined in by Chief Justice .Warren and Mr. Justice Brennan. Mr. Justice
Goldberg concurred joined by Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Stewart.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented joined by Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice
Clark
88 Supra note 34, at 689.
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jury may now exercise discretion which was not previously available in applying antitrust standards to labor-management agreements.
This may give rise to evidentiary difficulties in ascertaining whether
a union was acting alone or in concert with other employers.
Especially significant is the fact that there was no direct evidence of
a conspiracy in Pennington, but that this fact was inferred from
the wage agreement and the circumstances arising therefrom. There
may also be a judicial tendency toward a liberal construction of the
"conspiracy" concept, which may lead to antitrust convictions on
the basis of a collective bargaining agreement alone.3 9
The instant case represents a setback for organized labor.
Unions will be more restrained at the bargaining table; they will
try to avoid non-mandatory subjects in fear of setting adverse
precedent. In addition, there is the possibility of court-and-jurymade labor legislation," which may reflect the growing dissatisfaction with union policies which has asserted itself in the past two
decades.
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RETAIL PRICING OF LIQUOR HELD CONSTITUTIONAL. - Plaintiff
sought an injunction to restrain the enforcement of that section of
the New York Alcoholic Beverage Control Law which regulated
the price at which brand-name liquor was sold in New York.'
Plaintiff contended that since the law was not designed to promote
temperance, it was an unconstitutional exercise of police power and
an unjustified interference with interstate commerce. In sustaining
the statute, the Court of Appeals, in a four to three decision, held
that the regulation was within the broad police power traditionally
exercised by the states under the twenty-first amendment. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 16 N.Y.2d 47, 209 N.E.2d
701, 262 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1965).
9
3 It is possible that the "most favored nation" clause, found in many
labor-management agreements, is now invalid according to the instant case.
This clause allows renegotiation by the employer if competitors secure more
favorable terms from the union. 59 LAB. Rr. REP. (27 L.R.R.M.) 238,
242-43 (Aug. 2, 1965).
40 This is the reasoning of Justice Goldberg.
(concurring opinion).

Supra note 34, at 697

I The section provided that vendors must sell brand-name liquor in
New York at prices certified by them to be no higher than the lowest price
at which the brand was sold to any wholesaler or state agency elsewhere

in the country, during the previous month.

§ 101-b(3) (d)-(k) (Supp. 1965).
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